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Abstract: Non-tariff measures (NTMs) beyond traditional trade policy instruments define the 
requirements that importing countries imposed on foreign products. Due to differences across 
countries, requirements for supplying foreign markets can lead to trade costs and thus hamper 
international trade. In this paper, we introduce two regulatory heterogeneity indexes which are 
subsequently applied to the case maximum residue levels (MRLs) of pesticides. The 
Heterogeneity Index of Trade (HIT) reflects the respective differences across countries based 
on the assumption that the mere fact of difference in requirements causes trade costs. Taking 
the HIT index as a starting point, the Actual Heterogeneity Index (AHI) specially considers 
the situation where the requirements demanded by the importing country are stricter than 
those of the exporting country. The focuses is on the pesticide MRLs that the EU27 and 10 
trade partner countries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Japan, New Zealand, 
Russia and the US) apply on a set of agri-food products (cheese, beef, pig meat, potatoes, 
tomatoes, apples and pears, aubergines, peppers, maize, barley and rape seed). In particular, 
we take the EU export perspective as the benchmark for the comparison and calculate the 
indexes. The indexes identify if the respective MRLs are similar or dissimilar, equal, stricter 
or more lenient, and the results of our analysis thus point out potential areas for negotiating 
equivalence or other strategies in order to overcome the possible trade-restricting impact of 
diverging MRLs. 
 
Keywords: Non-tariff measures (NTMs), maximum residue levels (MRLs), regulatory 
heterogeneity index, agri-food trade, index analysis 
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1. Introduction  
This research is part of the on-going EU project “NTM impact” which has the overall 
objective to collect and analyse new data on non-tariff measures (NTMs), particularly those 
related to technical and sanitary standards-related measures and regulations that prescribe the 
conditions for importing agri-food products into the EU market and into a selection of major 
players that define the international market.1  
There is a growing concern surrounding trade effects of national regulations which are 
biased against imports. It is widely argued that despite the non-economic concerns pursued by 
regulatory policies, their introduction can present important economic effects as they shape 
trade (Casella, 1996, Thornsbury, 1998; Thilmany and Barret, 1997; Roberts et al., 1999).  
Governments, market players and other entities can use standard-related measures and 
regulations as an effective way to achieve legitimate commercial and policy objectives when 
externalities or other market failures are addressed. In this instance, the technical and 
standards related measures have the potential to increase national welfare (Thornsbury, 1998; 
Roberts et al., 1999). However, the introduction of requirements that are overly burdensome, 
discriminatory, out-dated, or otherwise inappropriate, might undermine competition, stifle 
innovation and result in unnecessary technical or sanitary barriers to trade. Negotiating the 
removal of such barriers can be much more difficult than agreeing on reducing tariffs since 
regulations are introduced, in principle, to serve legitimate and necessary purposes. In 
addition, since these usually apply to both national and foreign products, the measure cannot 
be characterized as a classical form of protectionism that openly discriminates against 
imports. Ideally, negotiators should be able to distinguish between merely protective from 
                                                 
1
 For more information about the project see www.ntm-impact.eu. 
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protectionist measures. This has been recognized, though, as a challenge for policy makers 
considering that the theory of trade policy presents no conclusive and unique formula to 
identify whether these rules and the issues underlying them are sustained by legitimate 
purposes or not. Despite these difficulties, there have been important contributions to develop 
methodological approaches and applied research that provides indications regarding the 
effects of this category of NTMs on trade.  
Beghin and Bureau (2001) presented a review of quantitative approaches used to the 
capture the impact of technical and sanitary regulations upon trade. These authors 
distinguished a set of methods that rely on the measurement of possible trade impacts such as 
price-wedge estimation, surveys and gravity models. As methods grounded on welfare 
economics the study indicated comparative statics or cost-benefit analysis and general 
equilibrium analysis. More recently, Korinek, Melatos and Rau (2008) reviewed several 
applied studies to quantify the trade effects of standards and technical regulations. Their 
conclusion suggests that there can be serious limitations associated to analyses based on 
inventory results such as frequency and coverage measures while disregarding particular 
information about the regulation content and/or process attributes of products underlying the 
regulations. 
Achterbosch et al. (2009) used an index of regulatory heterogeneity as a promising tool 
to measure the extent by which relevant regulations differ between countries. The argument 
sustaining their work is that usually the relative differences between regulated requirements at 
home and in the importing country are not explicitly considered in studies although this 
difference can result in additional cost for exporting firms.  
Interesting insights for policymakers regarding the relative importance of regulations 
and standard-related measures arise from econometric analysis considering dissimilarity and 
heterogeneity indexes. These have been used in several applied research to deal with 
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additional costs for exports due to divergent NTMs regulations between countries that 
establish trade relations (Cantore et al., 2008; Berden et al., 2009; Sunesen et al., 2009; 
Achterbosch et al., 2009; Vigani et al., 2010). In particular, Rau et al. (2010) introduced the 
Heterogeneity Index of Trade (HIT) by focusing on the substance of the requirements and 
how to measure them in terms of regulatory heterogeneity. The objective of this paper is to 
present the HIT index and the Actual Heterogeneity Index as a complementary index, which 
is particularly suitable for the analysis of maximum residue level (MRLs) considering that in 
this specific case, regulatory divergence may not always imply compliance costs for the 
exporting firms. 
2. Overview of studies applying heterogeneity indices 
This section presents a survey of studies that analyse diverging regulations between 
countries, and in the trade context between exporting and importing countries. The studies 
look at differences in regulations and resulting costs by applying some kind of indication of 
regulatory (dis)similarity or heterogeneity. 
Nicoletti et al. (2000) analysed the relative stringency of standards-related measures 
applied to manufacturing goods. The standards were classified from zero (least stringent) to 
six (highest stringency) and summed to form an index of differences in regulations across 
OECD countries. Kox and Lejour (2005) used a binary approach to develop an index for 
policy heterogeneity in the service sector using a binary approach. The number assumed by 
the index would be equal one, when the regulation differs between countries and 0 otherwise. 
Berden et al. (2009) examined the main NTMs involved in the EU-US trade using a 
global business survey. They analysed regulatory divergence faced by companies in their 
exporting activities using a bilateral NTM index which assumes values between 0 (no 
regulatory divergence) and 100 (absolute divergence). The results showed that diverging 
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regulations between the US and EU increased trade costs by 73% for trade flows from the EU 
to the US and 57% for those from the US to the EU countries. Using a similar approach, 
Sunesen et al. (2009) analysed the impacts of NTMs on trade between Japan and the EU 
countries. They focus on regulatory obstacles that EU companies face when exporting to 
Japan. The heterogeneity index constructed showed a divergence level of 60.0 for EU 
exporters of beverages and food.  
Cantore et al. (2008) evaluated trade of agricultural products in Italy using a gravity 
model. The hypothesis tested that among countries for which the organic sector is regulated, 
the most “affine” ones are the countries in which standards are more similar. The authors 
generate a similarity index based on survey data from practitioners with managerial and/or 
technical expertise. The results indicated that trade is more intense between countries with 
relatively similar certification systems.  
Vigani et al. (2010) used a gravity model to analyse how bilateral ‘similarity’ in 
regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMO) affects trade flows. The analysis was 
based on a composite index of the stringency of GMO regulation for a sample of about sixty 
countries to test how similarity/dissimilarities in GMO regulation affect bilateral trade flows. 
The results showed that strong differences in these regulations result in lower trade. Labelling 
system, approval process and traceability requirements were identified as the most important 
GMO regulatory dimensions. 
Achterbosch et al. (2009) analysed the impact of differences in regulation of maximum 
residue levels (MRLs) for pesticides on Chilean fruit exports to the EU. A heterogeneity index 
for pesticide was constructed using the actual difference in MRL. The difference in MRLs 
was divided by their sum in order to turn the absolute value of the difference in a standard 
value lying in the interval [-1; 1]. Their conclusion suggested that the depth of information 
generated by the index severely compromises its coverage such that further development of 
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heterogeneity index should be aimed at including elements of process standards and 
conformity assessment procedures. 
Within the NTM-impact project, Rau et al. (2010) proposed the construction of the 
Heterogeneity Index of Trade (HIT) to evaluate the heterogeneity of different import 
requirements in international agri-food trade. The HIT index presents an advantage over the 
index developed by Achterbosch et al. (2009) because it allows for including measures that 
can be represented by binary and ordinal variables, such as elements of process standards and 
conformity assessment procedures. However, the construction of the HIT index is based on 
the assumption that the existence of heterogeneity (dissimilarity) always implies costs for the 
exporting country. That is, regulatory heterogeneity is assumed to result in costs for the 
exporters, when the requirements imposed by importing countries are more stringent, as well 
as when these are less stringent than the domestic requirements. This issue is addressed by the 
Actual Heterogeneity Index. Both the HIT and the AHI index are presented in the following 
sections. 
3. Index for regulatory heterogeneity: the case of MRLs 
3.1. Heterogeneity Index of Trade (HIT) 
This section provides a brief introduction of the HIT index. Rau et al. (2010) derived the 
HIT index and also provided details about its properties, practical application and 
interpretation. The idea behind the HIT index is to compare different requirements, which are 
relevant in agri-food trade ranging from product and process standards to firm-level 
conformity assessment measures and country requirements. The HIT index is especially 
constructed so as to combine binary, ordered and quantitative information, which has been 
extracted from documents about the respective requirements in the data collection effort of the 
project “NTM impact” (compare 4.1). 
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Based on the Gower index of (dis)similarity, the HIT index is defined as follows: 
 (1) 
where j and k respectively denote the importing and exporting country, and i refers to 
the characteristics or rather requirements looked at. Some characteristics or requirements can 
be more important than others, and this is captured by the weight . 
 refers to a dissimilarity measure, which is defined by the following equation: 
 (2) 
where x refers to the binary, ordered or quantitative information of the characteristic or 
requirement, which the exporting and importing country respectively impose. 
The HIT index is specific to pairs of trading partner countries, and thus defined and 
calculated on a bilateral basis by comparing standards and regulations set by an importing and 
an exporting country. The HIT index allows for aggregation and disaggregation across diverse 
regulations, which involve a different kind of information i.e. measurable and non-measurable 
information contents. The value of the HIT index is increasing with differences in regulations. 
The HIT index assumes values between 0 and 1. For HITjk  = 0, there is no difference in 
the requirements between the importing and exporting country. For HITjk = 1, requirements 
are very different. As such, the HIT index provides information about (dis)similarity of 
regulations across countries and does not measure the costs that exporters could incur when 
selling their products on foreign markets. The link between difference in regulations in trade 
and compliance and/or trade costs is not considered. As mentioned above, the HIT index is 
defined to accommodate and compare different types of requirements across countries and 
thus first and foremost focuses on the question if regulations of trading partner countries are 
similar or dissimilar. For the interpretation of the HIT index, it is however argued that the 
8 
 
mere differences in regulations across countries cause costs for exporters and thus influence 
international trade flows. 
3.2. Actual Heterogeneity Index (AHI) 
This section introduces the AHI index which is developed based on the assumptions that 
differences in standards and regulations do not always cause compliance costs and thus trade 
costs for exporters. Figure 1 presents a hypothetical example of MRL for pesticides to 
illustrate that even when dissimilarity in requirements between exporters and importers is 
different from zero trade might not require compliance costs. 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of implications of dissimilarity: MRL example 
 
Considering that Z is an exporting country and Y is an importing country of products 
subject to MRLs of pesticides A, B, C and D such as those indicated in Figure 1. For 
pesticides A and B, there is no difference between requirements such that (dis)similarity is 
Maximum Residue Level (MRL) 
 
Pesticides 
Countries 
Z Y 
A 4 4 
B 40 40 
C 30 10 
D 10 100 
For Pesticides A and B:  
No dissimilarity between importer and exporter  no compliance costs for exporters (Z). 
Pesticide C 
Dissimilarity ≠ 0; importing country (Y) is more stringent than exporters (Z) 
 compliance costs for exporters. 
Pesticide D  
Dissimilarity ≠ 0; importing country (Y) is less stringent than exporters (Z) 
 no compliance costs for exporters. 
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equal zero. For pesticide D, the exporting country (Z) is more stringent than the importing 
country and there is thus no need for exporters to make adjustments to meet the MRLs set by 
the importing country. In the case of pesticide C, however, costly adjustments are necessary 
since the MRL requirements of the exporting country are less stringent than those set by the 
importing country. 
The AHI index developed in this section recognizes that dissimilarities might not result 
in compliance costs for exporters. Hence, when the absolute value of this difference is added 
to a differential that effectively implies compliance costs, the resulting dissimilarity measure 
can present a positive bias and overestimate the dissimilarity that implies in actual costs. This 
can give an upward biased indicator of the degree of dissimilarity between country 
regulations. A small change is proposed to avoid this bias such as the identification and 
exclusion of these cases to calculate the regulatory heterogeneity index, whenever there are no 
additional compliance costs.  
A first step for tackling this problem requires that not only the absolute value of the 
numerator has to be investigated, but also its sign. In the calculation of the AHI index, the 
sign is an important indication of whether there will be compliance costs involved when 
countries establish trade relations. This idea follows Achterbosch et al. (2009) that used a 
heterogeneity index for pesticide which takes into account if the requirements of exporters are 
more stringent than those of the importers and vice versa. 
Given the formulation of the HIT index in equation (1), the AHI index is also 
calculated as the weighted average value of the actual heterogeneity measure as follows:  
 (3) 
where wijk is the weight of characteristics or respective requirements i looked at. 
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The AHI index is constructed by a modified formulation of dissimilarity measure, 
which does not assume the absolute value in the numerator like in the dissimilarity 
formulation of the HIT index (compare equation 2).  
The interpretations resulting from the dissimilarity measure are as follows: 
i. Dissimilarity ( ) < 0: 
Indicating that the importing country j imposes stricter requirements for a given set 
of characteristics i than the ones of the exporting country k such that the exporting 
country will need to make adjustments to meet the MRLs in order to be allowed to 
sell in the foreign market; 
ii. Dissimilarity ( ) ≥ 0: 
Indicating that the regulations introduced by the importing country j for 
characteristics i are the same or less restrictive than the ones of the exporting country 
k such that there is no compliance costs. 
 
The HIT index considers the dissimilarity that does not imply effective compliance 
costs for exporters, by taking the absolute value in the numerator. The AHI index can be 
alternatively defined to express only the cases where the regulation introduced by the importer 
country is more stringent than that of the exporter country. Hence, the following equations 
apply to the AHI index: 
AHIjk = 0 for  (4) 
 for  (5) 
 
Equation (4) is introduced to ensure that differences in regulation which do not imply 
additional compliance are not included in the heterogeneity index. Therefore, the indicator 
proposed in this paper differs from Achterbosch et al. (2009) since it only takes into account 
factors of dissimilarity regulation when the importing country requirements are stricter. 
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Considering the conditions for the AHI index, 0 ≤ AHIjk ≤ 1. As such, the advantage of 
the HIT index is maintained in order to allow for further aggregation of measures such as for 
MRLs (which include unidirectional compliance costs) and other requirements, which include 
costs in both directions due to divergence in labelling requirements and conformity 
assessment procedures for example. Figure 2 illustrates the range values of the AHI index and 
their respective interpretation. 
 
 
Source: own illustration. 
Figure 2: Value range of the AHI index and cost implications 
 
The AHI index has the following properties: 
• The dissimilarity of MRLs between two countries is presented only when it implies 
in higher costs for the exporter. This means that the AHI will only increase when a 
difference in regulation implies higher trade costs for exporters. 
• The index considers that differences between regulations, which do not require 
expenditure for compliance, should not be included in the calculation such that these 
are set to equal zero. 
• Resulting index values close to zero imply a generally lower stringency and probably 
lower trade costs (compliance costs) involved for the exporter. Values close to one 
indicates that the importers’ requirements are more stringent and exporting countries 
will be subject to higher costs in order to adjust their MRLs. 
 
  
 1 
Highest dissimilarity 
between countries 
0 
Equal standard 
between countries 
Importer country more stringent than 
exporter (compliance costs to adjust the 
MRL levels) 
Exporter country more stringent than 
importer (no compliance costs)  
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• The index covers the case of equal MRLs for pairs of importing and exporting 
countries. 
• The effect of bans imposed by importers can be included in the index calculation. 
• The value of the AHI index can be aggregated with other sub-indices for other 
regulation and measures. 
4. Application of the HIT and AHI indexes: MRLs of pesticides 
4.1. Data base 
Information about the maximum level of several types of residues allowed in agri-food 
products is available from different sources. In many countries national authorities that 
control food safety matters, for example, provide information about the MRLs relevant for 
supplying the domestic market. The database by the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of 
the US Department of Agriculture should be explicitly mentioned here because it not only 
contains the MRLs for pesticides and veterinary drugs relevant in the US market but also 
gives the corresponding MRLs imposed by other countries. Usually, the data information 
provided by national authorities however tend to focus on national MRLs. Comparing MRLs 
across countries is not as straight as straightforward as it initially may seem to be. That is 
since countries regulate different substances in different ways. For example, countries do not 
necessarily regulate the same pesticide. In fact, regulations of residue limits depend on 
prevailing production practises, the consumption of products, which are treated with and/or 
contain the respective residues, as well as the possibilities available to detect residues in 
laboratory testing.  
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The MRL database used for the index calculation in this paper is part of the recent 
initiative of the EU project “NTM impact”, which has already been mentioned above and 
aims at providing comparable information of import requirements across countries 
(henceforth called “NTM impact” database).2 While the “NTM impact” database also 
contains information about the residue limits for veterinary drugs, microbiological criteria, 
contaminants as well as food additives, the pesticide MRLs have been chosen for this first and 
new index calculation. The respective MRLs refer to the requirements that countries impose 
on domestic but also foreign products to be sold on the market. 
In general, MRLs are product-specific, and the products covered in the “NTM impact” 
database include the following products: cheese, beef, pig meat, potatoes, tomatoes, apples 
and pears, aubergines, peppers, maize, barley and rape seed. Focusing on these products, the 
database respectively provides the MRLs for the EU27 and ten trade partner countries 
(Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Japan, New Zealand, Russia India and the US). 
Information about MRLs that are internationally agreed upon and known as the Codex 
Alimentarius has also been collected. In the “NTM impact” database, these international 
residue limits are considered just like another country, denoted by COD in this paper. The 
Codex Alimentarius could be used as a benchmark for comparing the MRLs, but in this paper 
we take the perspective of EU exporters and hence the EU MRLs constitute our benchmark in 
the index calculation and subsequent analysis. Table 1 shows the number of pesticide MRLs, 
as collected in the “NTM impact” database.  
                                                 
2
 For details about the database and the data collection effort, in particular the issue of missing information and no regulation 
see Shutes et al. (2011). The following partners have been involved in the database (alphabetical order) and their efforts are 
much appreciated: Escuela Superior de Agricultura (USP) (Brazil), Landbouw-Economisch Instituut B.V. (LEI) (The 
Netherlands), Laval University (ULaval) (Canada), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) (France), 
Institute for Agricultural Market Studies (IKAR) (Russia), Institute of Development Studies (IDS) ( England), Institute of 
Geographical Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CCAP) (China), Instituto Nacional 
de Tecnologia Agropecuaria (INTA) (Argentina), Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (K.U.Leuven) (Belgium), Research and 
Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) ( India), Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitaet Bonn (Germany), 
Slovak Agricultural University (SAU) (Slovakia ), University of Otago (Otago) (New Zealand), Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State University (VT), (United States), University of Sydney (UNSYD) (Australia), Otsuki and Kimura (Japan). 
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Overall, the EU seems to regulate pesticides much more than other countries, but a large 
number of pesticide MRLs has also been reported for Russia and Japan. Many of the MRLs in 
the database actually refer to default values that countries tend to apply if risks are uncertain 
or scientific information is not available. With regard to EU MRLs, default values are the 
lowest residue concentration that can be detected (limit of determination). This may not be the 
case for all countries, but in general default values can be expected to be quite low, implying 
strict maximum residue limit. 
 
Table 1: Number of pesticide MRLs according to country and product. 
 ARG AUS BRA CAN CHN COD EU JAP NZL RUS USA 
Apples 127 117 41 76 45 81 430 261 82 394 108 
Aubergines 42 74 10 19 25 24 432 277 25 394 87 
Barley 75 30 15 36 16 61 427 254 61 392 75 
Bell Pepper 58 59 14 16 25 32 427 273 32 394 100 
Beef 48 238 10 71 0 106 323 227 107 394 146 
Cheese 99 1 0 9 0 0 316 0 0 394 37 
Maize/Corn 100 119 58 16 28 59 427 277 59 396 94 
Pears 108 94 9 51 39 70 430 258 71 394 99 
Pig(Hog Meat) 47 223 7 44 1 89 322 0 89 394 110 
Potatoes 102 79 55 51 5 73 427 258 74 393 102 
Rapeseed 32 61 0 31 6 32 428 235 32 393 97 
Tomatoes 107 104 58 58 31 76 429 292 78 394 115 
Note: India (IND) is not included in the table since only very few pesticide MRLs have been reported.  
Source: own calculation using “NTM impact” database. 
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4.2. Index analysis: Results and evaluation 
In the index analysis, we take the perspective of EU exporters and hence the EU MRLs 
constitute our benchmark for calculating and interpreting the HIT and AHI index. We first 
present the results of the index analysis by countries and the aggregate of agri-food products, 
which consists of the different agri-food products for which the data has been collected 
(compare section 4.1). This is followed by the index analysis by country and by the individual 
agri-food products. In the calculation of the index, the pesticide MRLs are assigned equal 
weights. Other options would generally be possible, but assigning different weights would 
heavily rely on expert knowledge about the pesticide and their importance for producing 
respective products. 
Figure 3 presents the average value of HIT and AHI index for pesticide MRLs 
according to trade partner countries. As shown, the values of the AHI index are always lower 
than the values of the HIT index. That is, since the AHI index only considers a subset of the 
MRL information collected, namely those whose values are stricter than the values set by the 
EU. For the HIT index, values close to one indicate great differences in MRLs. Including the 
information of the AHI index, values close to one additional imply that EU exporters face 
compliance costs as a result of more stringent MRLs required by the respective importing 
country. In some cases, the difference between the EU MRLs and the corresponding MRLs of 
the respective trading partner country is particularly large, and this seems to point out the 
general strictness of the EU MRLs. 
The results of the HIT index show that the pesticide MRLs set by most of the trade 
partner countries differ from the corresponding EU MRLs, which might be interpreted as a 
lower harmonization of regulations associated with good agricultural practices. The difference 
between the EU MRLs and the MRLs set by Canada and New Zealand, respectively, is rather 
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large, indicating great dissimilarity in particular. For Argentina, Australia and US, the value 
of the HIT index is comparably lower, indicating that the EU requirements are relatively more 
similar with their MRL requirements than with those of other trade partners. However, the 
corresponding values of the AHI index are comparatively higher and thus the dissimilarities, 
which the HIT index points out, almost always also imply compliance cost for EU exporters. 
Overall, the value of the HIT index for pesticide MRLs between the EU and Japan is smallest 
and thus the MRL profile of these two countries seems to be most similar in comparison to 
other EU trade partners 
 
 
Source: own calculation using “NTM impact” database. 
 
Figure 3: HIT and AHI index for pesticides by countries, EU requirements taken as 
benchmark for comparing regulatory heterogeneity. 
 
While the HIT index indicates regulatory (dis)similarity, the AHI index provides 
complementary information. The value of the AHI index shows that some of the 
dissimilarities pointed out by the HIT index do not imply compliance costs for EU exporters 
since the EU MRLs are more stringent than the MRLs demanded by the importing countries. 
This for example is the case for Canada, China and New Zealand (see Figure 3). Note that the 
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present application only covers pesticide MRLs. The AHI index thus refers to the compliance 
costs of EU exporters following their adjustments to the stricter MRLs demanded by the trade 
partners but does not consider potential costs due to other measures that are more or less 
associated with MRLs, for example conformity assessment, monitoring, inspection and 
documentation checks at the firm-level and/or at the border. 
In addition to the index values for the aggregate of agri-food products, we conduct an 
index analysis by country and the individual agri-food products. The results for the HIT index 
are presented in Table 2. Regarding the disaggregated product level, the values of the HIT 
index show that the products with the most dissimilar MRLs are aubergines, barley, bell 
pepper and rapeseed. For aubergines and bell pepper, the Indian MRL requirements diverge 
most from the EU ones, and very large differences are also observed for cheese and the 
respective MRLs set by Canada and New Zealand. 
Table 3 gives the corresponding results of the AHI index. As already mentioned the 
values are lower than the corresponding values of the HIT index. Overall, aubergines, barley, 
pears and tomatoes score the highest values, and thus the pesticides MRL for these products 
can be considered to lead to compliance costs for EU exporters. Since the values of the AHI 
index are relatively small, not close to one, the difference in MRL requirements that are more 
stringent than the EU MRLs, is relatively modest and compliance costs for EU exporters may 
be only little. The appendix provides the graphical presentation of the values of both the HIT 
and the AHI index in spider/radar charts that illustrate these results of the index analysis by 
country and individual agri-food products (see Figure A1.1, A1.2 and A2.1, A2.2, 
respectively). 
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Table 2: HIT index by countries and selected agri-food products 
  Apples Aubergines 
(eggplant) 
Barley Bell 
pepper 
Beef Cheese Maize/ 
Corn 
Pears Pork Potatoes Rape Tomatoes 
seed 
ARG 0.32 0.32 0.35 0.32 0.26 0.22 0.3 0.32 0.27 0.31 0.36 0.32 
AUS 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.3 0.24 0.33 0.33 0.3 0.34 0.36 0.37 
BRA 0.38 0.35 0.37 0.43 0.33 n/a 0.36 0.44 0.39 0.4 n/a 0.37 
CAN 0.56 0.56 0.6 0.57 0.65 0.73 0.6 0.56 0.66 0.6 0.57 0.58 
CHN 0.39 0.42 0.4 0.39 0.1 n/a 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.21 0.21 0.35 
COD 0.3 0.39 0.37 0.34 0.31 n/a 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.28 0.32 0.32 
JAP 0.32 0.36 0.31 0.35 0.21 0.14 0.3 0.32 0.17 0.29 0.32 0.35 
NZL 0.53 0.55 0.6 0.57 0.63 0.72 0.58 0.55 0.65 0.58 0.58 0.55 
RUS 0.31 0.47 0.49 0.5 0.33 0.42 0.41 0.34 0.38 0.36 0.31 0.36 
USA 0.33 0.34 0.37 0.34 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.33 0.28 0.33 0.36 0.34 
Average 0.38 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.34 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 
Note: n/a means that we could not calculate the index due to missing information. The information about the MRLs was not collected and/or not publically available. 
Source: own results using the NTM impact database. 
 
Table 3: AHI index by countries and selected agri-food products 
  Apples Aubergines 
(eggplant) 
Barley Bell 
Pepper 
Beef Cheese Maize/ 
Corn 
Pears Pork Potatoes Rapes Tomatoes 
seed 
ARG 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.25 0.21 0.26 0.29 0.25 0.29 0.36 0.3 
AUS 0.28 0.29 0.34 0.3 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.28 0.19 0.29 0.33 0.29 
BRA 0.22 0.31 0.12 0.21 0 n/a 0.08 0.09 0 0.16 n/a 0.27 
CAN 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.1 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.1 
CHN 0.05 0.03 0.1 0.04 0.08 n/a 0.01 0.06 0.05 0 0 0.03 
COD 0.05 0.22 0.15 0.1 0.05 n/a 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.17 0.11 
JAP 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.14 
NZL 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.07 
RUS 0.17 0.14 0.21 0.2 0.19 0.11 0.08 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.13 
USA 0.27 0.28 0.32 0.27 0.21 0.23 0.26 0.27 0.22 0.28 0.32 0.28 
Average 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.17 
Note: n/a means that we could not calculate the index due to missing information. The information about the MRLs was not collected and/or not publically available. 
Source: own results using the NTM impact database. 
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5. Summary and conclusions 
The paper introduces the Heterogeneity Index of Trade (HIT) and the Actual 
Heterogeneity Index (AHI) which provide complementary information about differences in 
NTMs in general and standards and regulation in particular. The HIT index is developed so as 
to accommodate binary, ordered and quantitative information, which describe import 
requirements in international trade. The AHI index builds upon the HIT index and considers 
the specific situation where the requirements demanded by the importing country are stricter 
than those of the exporting country. That is, the AHI index considers only dissimilarities 
which might imply compliance costs for European exporters due to more stringent level of the 
importing countries MRLs. With regard to the HIT index, it is argued that the mere fact of 
difference in requirements cause trade costs.  
In this paper, the HIT and the AHI index are applied to the case of pesticide MRLs by 
using the “NTM impact” database that has been established within the EU project “NTM 
impact. The focuses is on the pesticide MRLs that the EU27 and 10 trade partner countries 
(Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Japan, New Zealand, Russia and the US) apply 
on a set of agri-food products. For the index calculation, the EU export perspective serves as 
the benchmark for comparing the respective MRLs.  
The results of the HIT and the AHI index provide an overview of regulatory difference 
between the EU and its important trading partners. The AHI index gives the additional 
information about if the regulatory difference lead to compliance costs for EU exporters. With 
the focus of the case study, it should be noted that trade costs on a broader context, e.g. costs 
relating to conformity assessment, are not considered. This paper presents the first application 
of the HIT and the AHI and in this regard the index analysis should be extended so as to 
further explore regulatory differences between countries.  
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7. Appendix:  
Figure A1.1: Radar Chart of HIT index by country and selected agri-food products (I) 
 
Source: own illustration of results calculated using the NTM impact database. 
 
Figure A1.2: Radar Chart of HIT index by country and selected agri-food products (II) 
 
Source: own illustration of results calculated using the NTM impact database. 
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Figure A2.1: Radar Chart of AHI index by country and selected agri-food products (I) 
 
Source: own illustration of results calculated using the NTM impact database. 
 
Figure A2.2: Radar Chart of AHI index by country and selected agri-food products (II) 
 
Source: own illustration of results calculated using the NTM impact database. 
